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Abstract Human beings are predisposed to think of
evolution as teleological—i.e., having a purpose or direc-
tive principle—and the ways scientists talk about natural
selection can feed this predisposition. This work examines
the suggestion that students’ teleological thinking operates
as an obstacle when the natural selection evolution model is
taught. What we mean by obstacle is an established way of
thinking that resists change due to its explanatory power. In
light of this approach, the challenges of teaching evolution
in biology education have been revised, and improved
methodological strategies aimed at a better comprehension
of the Darwinian evolution model are suggested.
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Introduction
The goal of evolutionary biology is to trace the evolution of
organisms as well as to understand the mechanisms that
trigger evolutionary change. Therefore, evolutionary biolo-
gy ultimately analyzes the reasons why a biological system
has evolved in a particular manner—what Ernst Mayr
(1997) has called the “ultimate causes” of a biological
phenomenon. The implications of evolution theory far
exceed biology, with major consequences for fields as far
apart as epistemology and ethics (Ruse 2007). This is why,
from the scientific literacy perspective, it is of utmost
importance that the key concepts of evolutionary biology
are properly understood.
The present study explores the problems associated with
teaching and learning the natural selection model (NSM).
The difficulties faced by biology teachers when addressing
this subject are widely known: due to these impediments,
many people do not properly understand or do not accept
the theory of evolution (Alters and Nelson 2002; NASIM
2008). In particular, this work focuses on the occurrence of
a predisposition to teleological thinking in students that is
incompatible with the scientific model being taught and that
appears to be highly resistant to being changed.
The main hypothesis in this work is that teleological
thinking can be characterized as a core obstacle to properly
learning the NSM—the word obstacle here being used as
defined in science didactics (Astolfi 1997). Although the
incidence of students’ teleological thinking in learning
many concepts has already been pointed out, this work
highlights that its educational implications have not yet
been fully explored. Also, the characterization of teleolog-
ical thinking as an obstacle could become a powerful tool
for educational intervention aimed at enhancing the
evolution of students’ thinking.
Teleological Concepts of Biology Students
Comprehensive research in many different countries has
shown that students’ misconceptions are as diverse as they
are abundant (Alters and Nelson 2002; Anderson et al.
2002; Bishop and Anderson 1990; Brumby 1979, 1980;
Demastes et al. 1998; Gené 1991; Hallden 1988; Jungwirth
1975; Kattmann 2008; Lucas 1971; Martin 1983; Settlage
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1994; Smith 1994; Zohar and Ginossar 1998; Zuzovsky
1994, among others.). For instance, many biology students
believe that:
acquired traits are inherited
the onset of the human species was predetermined
evolution implies progress
living organisms can change according to their needs
Many of these ideas conform to a teleological view of
the organic world (Bardapurkar 2008; Ziegler 2008).
An explanation is said to be teleological when it resorts
to notions such as ends, goals, purposes, or objectives
(Rosenberg and McShea 2008). For instance, if we ask
ourselves, “Why did John switch the TV on?” And we
respond, “To watch his favorite program,” we are giving a
teleological explanation. Our explanation resorts to one of
John’s goals: watching his favorite program. In this
example, resorting to the notion of goal does not bring
conflict since we assume that John is a conscious and
intentional being, capable of conceiving goals and purpo-
ses. However, teleological explanations are habitually used
to explain the behavior of systems to which we cannot
easily attribute intention and consciousness. These kinds of
explanations are common in biology (Mayr 1998; Rosen-
berg and McShea 2008). Hence, expressions like the
following examples: “A flower produces perfume in order
to attract pollinizers,” “Lions usually live in groups called
prides in order to be able to hunt for big prey,” or “Whales
have a thick layer of fat under their skin in order to protect
themselves from the cold.” The attribution of function also
has teleological connotations. Examples of this are: “The
function of the heart is to pump blood,” “The function of
photosynthesis is to produce glucose,” or “The function of
decomposition is to recycle nutrients in the ecosystem.”
Note that “The function of the heart is to pump blood” can
easily be replaced by “Organisms have hearts in order to
pump blood.” Teleological examples are characterized by
the use of function, purpose, and objective terminology as
well as statements that declare that something exists for a
reason (Mayr 1998).
Research done in the field of biology didactics indicates
that students have resistant misconceptions of a teleological
nature. These results coincide with numerous studies in the
field of psychology highlighting the key role that teleolog-
ical thinking has in the way people interpret the biological
world (Lombrozo and Carey 2004; Keil 1998; Kelemen
1999a, b; Evans 2001; Inagaky and Hatano 2004; Opfer
2003; Atran 1998, 2001). For example, some authors point
out that young children show a “promiscuous teleology”
according to which the existence of all natural objects (like
mountains, rivers and living beings) responds to certain
purposes, frequently associated to human needs. This
teleological view is then restricted, in teenagers and adults,
to living beings only (Kelemen 1999a, b). Curiously, these
studies have seldom been cited in the domain of education.
This general kind of teleological thinking relating to
living organisms is eventually narrowed down to more
specific ideas such as “Felines have developed sharp
protractile claws in order to hunt down their prey.” In the
case of evolution, the wide range of students’ teleological
conceptions can be reduced to variations of the following
general ideas:
1. The evolutionary process is directed toward the
production of certain lineages or species (especially
human beings).
2. The evolutionary process is directed toward ensuring
the survival of a species.
As a consequence of the purpose assumed in (2), most
students believe that:
3. Individual variations appear according to needs im-
posed by the environment: these are directed toward
overcoming survival challenges (see, for example,
Bardapurkar 2008).
In this way, biology students tend to assume that all
biological features have some function and that evolution-
ary changes appear always as a result of particular goals.
For instance, most students assume that organisms inevita-
bly tend to lose those characteristics that they no longer
need, or that mutations involving adaptation advantages for
the species are more likely to occur. Therefore, adaptation
from this point of view becomes the outcome of the
transformation processes of each individual in response to
its survival needs.
On the other hand, the functional nature of teleological
conceptions has been underestimated in the literature
related to learning and teaching the NSM (Kelemen
1999a). Even if it is assumed that organisms do not respond
to certain purposes, it must be admitted that it appears as if
they actually respond to some purposes. The behavior of
biological systems seems to be directed to purposes
because it is mainly the product of natural selection, which
is responsible for the biological design. In fact, assuming
that biological systems (either individual organisms or their
parts) pursue some purpose is an excellent guide to
predicting how these systems will behave (Dawkins 1996;
Dennett 1987). This is why some authors suggest that this
way of thinking is an adaptation (a product of natural
selection). In this context, it is hardly surprising that when
thinking about how organisms evolve, people assume that
evolution is closely related to the pursuit of certain
purposes, such as survival. It is this functionality—this
explanatory and predictive power—which explains the
resistance to changing these conceptions. Why should
people change their way of thinking when this appears to
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be corroborated by everyday experience? This way of
thinking predicts that living beings are adapted and
adaptable systems, and so they are. Of course, the scientific
model has a broader explanatory power, and is more
consistent, than the teleological thinking shown by stu-
dents. However, evidence showing the limitations of
teleological conceptions does not occur spontaneously.
Hence, it is not easy to make students feel the shortcomings
of their thinking system, and it is even harder for them to
replace it with a different set of counterintuitive explan-
ations such as Darwinism.
It is possible to affirm that students interpret adaptation
phenomena in a teleological way: individual organisms are
born essentially with those traits they need; in certain
conditions, these can be tailored to their needs. This is
inconsistent with the Darwinian model. We will use the
term “common sense teleology” to refer to this non-
Darwinian way of thinking. This expression refers to the
thinking described by cognitive psychology.
For this work, the influence of religious thinking on
evolution has not been specifically undertaken, considering
the more general non-religious teleological point of view. In
fact, some authors argue that religious beliefs are built
around prior teleological thinking (Dawkins 2006; Kelemen
2004a, b). Although acknowledging that a religious
education complicates further the teaching of evolution,
our purpose in this study is to analyze the relevance to the
teaching process of a way of thinking that is common to
both religious and non-religious people.
Finally, a remark about the use of the term “Lamarck-
ian,” sometimes used to describe the spontaneous way of
pupils’ thinking described here as teleological. The work
we present indicates that the theoretical frame of students is
not Lamarckian inheritance—i.e., the inheritance of ac-
quired characteristics from one generation to the next—but
rather the functional finalist thinking described by cognitive
psychological studies, which we refer to here as “common
sense teleology.” The differences between the students’ way
of thinking and Lamarck’s theory are significant (see, for
instance, Kampourakis and Zogza 2007).
“Common Sense Teleology” as an Obstacle
The concept of obstacle, as used in science didactics, is
inspired by the concept of “epistemological obstacle”
suggested by the French philosopher Gaston Bachelard
(1938). This notion has been fully developed by, among
others, pedagogues like Jean Pierre Astolfi and Michael
Develay (Astolfi and Develay 1989). Within this theoretical
framework, an obstacle is a way of thinking which is lateral
or crosswise, as well as functional (Astolfi 1994). This
characterization highlights the difference between an
obstacle and a mere conception. The lateral or crosswise
nature of an obstacle indicates it is a general way of
thinking that can be expressed in relation to many specific
issues rather than just notions that are closely linked to a
conceptual domain. For example, linear causal thinking
presupposes that each event has a unique and immediate
cause. This way of thinking could become an obstacle
when formulating concepts related, for instance, to trophic
relationships in an ecosystem or to evolutionary processes.
The functional explanatory nature of an obstacle indicates
that this general way of thinking allows people to find
explanations for understanding phenomena of interest to
them. When such a thought system competes with a
scientific model that we intend to teach (i.e., it can provide
an explanation for a particular phenomenon), then it
becomes an obstacle.
It should be emphasized that from this perspective, an
obstacle should not be considered a purely negative factor.
While it is true that this thinking system may be
incompatible with the scientific model, therefore hindering
the learning process, it is equally true that this way of
thinking is initially the only explanatory framework
available to students for the analysis of a new concept.
That is why these ideas must be taken into account when
teaching, facilitating both efforts to make them explicit and
to have them questioned by students.
Why can “common sense teleology” be characterized as
an obstacle? Evidence in two significant fields allows us to
consider this: both cognitive psychology and science
didactics converge in highlighting the omnipresence and
functional importance of this way of thinking. Psychology
shows that teleological thinking in relation to living beings
is a typical cognitive feature of youngsters and adults—this
way of thinking being both crosswise (applies to all
biological domains) and functional (allows finding explan-
ations to biological phenomena). On the other hand,
biology didactics highlights the omnipresence and the
resistance of pupils’ teleological conceptions as recurrent
problems for teaching the NSM (Anderson et al. 2002;
Bishop and Anderson 1990; Bartov 1978, 1982; Settlage
1994; Zuzovsky 1994; Zohar and Ginossar 1998, among
others). Teleological thinking in relation to many subjects is
deeply ingrained and has been found even among chemistry
students and teachers (Talanquer 2007).
Implications for Teaching
Teleology has always been regarded as a problem for
teaching based on the assumption that scientific models are
not teleological. Hence, these are two incompatible princi-
ples at odds with one another. Teachers’ worries regarding
this subject often translate into forbidding students the use
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of teleological expressions; at best, the heuristic value of
teleological thinking has been recognized (Kattmann 2008;
Zohar and Ginossar 1998). However, if cognitive psychol-
ogy results are taken seriously, it can be concluded that it is
impossible to eliminate teleological thinking from students.
Considering its functional nature, we should ask if its
elimination is desirable at all.
The theoretical framework adopted in this study sug-
gested that we should make students aware of the way they
tend to think when analyzing biological systems. In order
for this to happen, we need to make explicit ways of
thinking that are normally implicit. This is a necessary
condition for the development of students’ capacity to
identify their own ways of reasoning. In turn, this would
allow them to evaluate their own style of thinking and
adopt it to a particular scientific model of reference. This
proposal implies giving a central role to students’ cognitive
abilities. Therefore, finding the key differences between
their a priori conceptions and the scientific model becomes
important. Far from banning teleological expressions in the
classroom, this perspective acknowledges the need to resort
to these (Zohar and Ginossar 1998). Educators should bring
to light the teleological obstacle so as to turn it into the
object of analysis. The challenge for teachers would then be
that their students acknowledge which of their a priori
suppositions are incompatible with the scientific model and
which are advantageous. This understanding would serve as
a stepping stone toward students monitoring themselves for
their own teleological thoughts and correcting them within
the NSM framework.
What is important then is not correcting ways of
expressing thoughts but making ways of thinking visible.
According to this proposal, it is not wrong to ask, “What is
the X trait good for?” Nor is it wrong to create hypotheses
such as “the X trait is good for F.” It is not even wrong to
say that certain organisms have developed throughout their
evolution an “X” trait to perform a function “F”. These
expressions could be both the manifestation of “common
sense teleology” and genuine Darwinian reasoning. As a
matter of fact, biologists frequently use these sorts of
expressions. Given this ambiguity, the important thing is
that students are able to explain what exactly they mean by
using these expressions. Within the classroom context, it is
not easy to identify students’ reference framework from
these expressions. How could teachers facilitate making
these implicit theoretical frameworks explicit? From this
perspective, teachers will only be able to know the
reference framework of their students by making them
acknowledge it when faced with questions that require
complex explanations.
Identifying obstacles can also be a powerful guide to the
design of classes. This is the central idea of the notion of
“objective–obstacle” due to Jean Louis Martinand (Astolfi
1997; Martinand 1986). Basically, the idea is that over-
coming the obstacle becomes the main objective of classes
in the long run. This approach implies designing activities
that allow to make explicit, and to question, obstacles or
their expression. As well, it implies highlighting the aspects
of the model to be taught that are incompatible with the
obstacle. In the case of the NSM, for instance, the dicey
nature of the origin of genetic variability constitutes a
central point. Analysis of evidence favoring the scientific
model and refuting misconceptions can be very useful.
However, such a procedure cannot totally overcome the
obstacle (Astolfi 1994). The logic of refutation, implicit in
some models of conceptual change, has serious limitations
given the ingrained character of the structures of thought
we call obstacles.
Some ways of working within the theoretical framework
of this study are suggested in the following section:
& In general, students’ teleological expression should not
be censored. If the spontaneous form of expression is
teleological, then it will be necessary to seek further for
the patterns of thought underlying such forms of
expression. Students’ ideas should come out in the
classroom in order to make them the object of analysis.
The objective is to catalyze the evolution of the
underlying thought structures and not merely superfi-
cially change the ways of expression.
& It is necessary to engage students in activities that involve
explaining and debating. If a task does not require
activating these cognitive abilities, then the thought
structures of students remain inert and “invisible” to both
teacher and students. Examples of these would be: asking
students to explain how and why bacteria become
resistant to an antibiotic or how and why did fish living
in caves lose the sense of sight. In order for students’
thought structures to become explicit, an atmosphere of
confidence is required so that they do not feel undercut
when expressing their ideas.
& In higher courses, we can explain to students what
teleological explanations consist of. Then students can
be given a list of statements (some of which are
teleological) and be asked to identify which these are.
In those cases where teleological expressions are not
acceptable, students could be asked to express the same
idea in a non-teleological manner. For example, to
elaborate a non-teleological text replacing the statement
“Nature has provided llamas with a thick coat of hair so
that they can endure the bitter cold climate of the
Andes.”
& Students can be asked to write down their initial
explanations (prior to teaching the NSM) about a
particular problem, for instance, the development of
resistance to insecticides. Once the model has been
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learned, they can read their initial explanations in order
to identify teleological expressions in them. This
exercise will facilitate becoming conscious of what
students thought then and what they think now so that
they can see the evolution of their way of thinking.
Significantly, many will acknowledge that they still
tend to think in a teleological manner concerning
certain problems.
& Many times, students’ teleological reasoning is guided
by analogy. For example, students might think that
living organisms resolve their survival needs in a
manner similar to that of human beings. This analogy
should then be explicitly brought up so students have
the chance to consider how these processes are similar
or different. An example might be the remarkable
convergence between certain technologies and certain
organic adaptations: for instance, animal echolocation,
used by several animals like bats, and human echolo-
cation or SONAR (sound navigation and ranging),
commonly used by submarines. The students can be
asked to write a text explaining the origin of both
systems and pointing out differences and analogies
between both of them that they consider important.
Some might fear that this activity could encourage
teleological thinking in students. However, it should be
pointed out that students make these analogies in any
case, and therefore, it is better to make these analogies
explicit, rather than leaving them concealed, so that
they can become the object of analysis.
& Students can be asked to analyze the concept of
mutation—and mutants, such as those appearing in
science fiction: Spiderman, the Incredible Hulk, etc.—
in order to identify how these ideas contradict scientific
models (González Galli et al. 2008). The concept of
mutation, implicit in much science fiction, has a lot in
common with students’ teleological misconceptions
such as, “mutations are directed toward adaptation.”
Other science fiction productions can be used to analyze
other teleological misconceptions. For example, the
recent film “Avatar” (Avatar, 2010, directed by James
Cameron) presents a vision of a planet that functions
like a “super-organism.” According to this idea, which
relates to James Lovelock’s hypothesis of Gaia, each
organism in this planet has a function in the overall
sustainment of the planet as a whole. This is a
conception with strong teleological connotations and
incompatible with the NSM (Dawkins 1998; Kirchner
2002). Many people appear to have conceptions of this
kind (Kelemen and Rosset 2009). When revising ideas
in science fiction productions, students—in an indirect
manner—revise their own conceptions.
& Students can be asked to analyze the theoretical
framework underlying a particular expression. For
example, they could analyze the statement “Polar bears
turned white during their evolution in order to camou-
flage in the snow.” They could then be asked to think
what this statement would mean if made by a Darwinist
biologist, or a Lamarckian biologist, or by a relative or
friend knowing little biology. This type of analysis is
useful so that students become conscious of the
ambiguous nature of linguistic expressions and the need
to explain more clearly what they want to say.
& Once the obstacle appears to have been overcome, it is
useful to propose to students other different and more
complex cases than those analyzed. It is common that
the obstacle may reappear. Even students who can
provide correct Darwinian explanations in cases similar
to those already discussed in the classroom might resort
to teleological explanations when they cannot apply the
model to more complex cases. For example, this
“reversion” is common when analyzing for the first
time cases of loss of structure, such as the example
mentioned of blind fish in caves. This type of exercise
is useful so that students become aware that teleological
thinking may still be present. In this way, they can
understand the need to be alert and vigilant for the
tendency of this way of thinking.
These strategies are aimed at developing students’ meta-
cognitive skills. Therefore, the educational benefit of this
approach in the classroom exceeds the specific topic being
taught since the development of these cognitive tools can
improve students’ learning in other areas.
About the Nature of the Natural Selection Evolution
Model
This final section highlights another potential source of
difficulties for the learning and teaching of the NSM.
Teleology constitutes a central problem for the philoso-
phy of biology (Allen et al. 1998), in particular the
legitimacy of teleological explanations (e.g., Hull and Ruse
2007; Mayr 1998; Ruse 1973; Sober 2000). It is within this
framework that explanations based on the Darwinian model
are the object of debate. The reason is that teleological
explanations seem to invert the temporal relation between
causes and effects (since goals are in the future) and
suggest some sort of intentionality in the universe.
However, several authors have suggested that certain
teleological explanations are legitimate from a scientific
viewpoint. More specifically, some authors maintain that
the NSM, and explanations derived from it, have a
teleological nature (Ayala 1970, 1995, 1998, 1999; Dennett
1995, 1987; Lewens 2002; Ruse 2000, 2007; Lennox 1993,
1994, 2008, 2010; Caponi 2003; Short 2001). This
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suggestion does not presuppose in any way that evolution
through natural selection implies a directionality ensuring
the production of certain species, nor that individual
variation is oriented toward an adaptation gain for the
species. Those considering that the NSM is teleological
consider as well that this is perfectly legitimate from the
scientific viewpoint. Darwinian explanations are completely
naturalistic and do not imply any metaphysical assumptions
that are incompatible with scientific standard criteria, which
means that for these authors, the NSM implies a perfectly
natural form of teleology that has nothing to do with pre-
Darwinian teleology. Thus, while some authors consider
that Darwin eliminated teleology from biology, others
consider that he naturalized it (Lennox 2008, p. 81; Sober
2000, p. 84).
The different arguments given by these authors—not
detailed here—converge in pointing out the teleological
nature of the NSM. For instance, it could be mentioned that
for Michael Ruse, teleological language in biology relies on
a metaphor (the metaphor of design; Ruse 2000, 2008).
This would seem to suggest that the NSM is not
teleological in itself. However, Ruse claims that reliance
on metaphor is inevitable in order to explain adaptation. If
metaphor is part of the theory, then the theory would be
teleological. Ruse points out that non-teleological explan-
ations exclusively based on past facts to explain adaptation
can only be retrospectively constructed after having thought
about the metaphor of design. First we ask: “what for?” of a
particular trait analyzed, and then we construct the
Darwinian explanation. Thus, argues Ruse, we use the
metaphor of design and then pretend not to have used it. As
Ruse points out, as long as it is not possible to explain
adaptation phenomena without resorting to the metaphor of
design (evidently teleological), then both the phenomenon
to be explained and the explanations themselves are, in a
relevant sense, teleological.
Although the suggestion that the NSM is teleological is
polemic, it might be relevant to consider it. From a more
general perspective, it is necessary to analyze the specific
characteristics of a scientific model to be taught so as to
identify intrinsic knots that may complicate both teaching
and learning. In our particular case, it could be thought that
the teleological nature of the NSM would increase the
difficulty in dealing with students’ misconceptions exposed
earlier. If the model in itself is teleological, then it could be
even more difficult to eliminate teleological expressions in
biology. On the other hand, if the model is teleological,
then the capability of applying the Darwinian model to
explain the organic world requires the activation of
teleological thinking. Finally, the similarity between stu-
dent’s non-Darwinian teleological expressions and teachers’
Darwinian teleological expressions could complicate iden-
tifying and distinguishing both theoretical frameworks.
These considerations reinforce our previous conclusions
that what is important for teaching is not eliminating
teleological thinking but rather stimulating students’ capac-
ity to be conscious of the existence of such ways of
thinking (meta-cognition).
Even in the case that the NSM is not considered
teleological, the problem remains that biologists and
teachers resort frequently to teleological expressions. These
expressions are powerful means of expressing NSM ideas.
As mentioned earlier, the trouble is that students produce
the same type of expressions from a completely different
theoretical framework. Whereas students’ non-Darwinian
teleological expressions are “common sense teleology,” as
described by cognitive psychologists, biologists, and
teachers, teleological expressions are, on the contrary,
expressions of the Darwinian NSM. Therefore, it is still
necessary to explicitly identify and distinguish both these
theoretical frameworks in order to stimulate the conscious-
ness of such different ways of thinking.
Conclusion
Teleological thinking in relation to living beings is a
fundamental characteristic of our psyche, as highlighted
both by biology didactics and cognitive psychology. The
notion of obstacle is a powerful framework for analyzing
the implications to education of certain thinking processes
and for the design of useful didactics oriented to
overcoming them.
This study highlights the need to revise some education-
al objectives, in particular the pretension of eliminating
teleological expressions and the ways of thinking behind
them. This conclusion is not only supported by the
acknowledgement of the heuristic value of it: teleological
thinking is a characteristic of our cognitive apparatus that is
neither possible—nor desirable—to eliminate. From this
perspective, educational work should focus more on
developing students’ meta-cognitive capacities. Students
should be capable of recognizing the teleological tendencies
of their thinking and understand the limitations and dangers
of this. Talanquer (2009) reaches similar conclusions about
what he calls cognitive constraints. This work highlights
the necessity of reflecting upon the question of teleological
explanations in biology and the nature of the NSM.
The approach developed in this work does not pretend
to deal with all difficulties encountered when teaching
evolution, such as probabilistic logic, religious faiths, or
emotional resistance. The perspective presented here
draws attention to the necessity of analyzing students’
conceptualizations as well as the intrinsic complexities of
the scientific models teachers would like students to
learn.
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